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California's Groundwater Management Since the
Governor's Commission Review: The Consolidation of
Local Control
David A. Sandino*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law
("Commission") issued its Final Report reviewing California water law and
policy twenty-five years ago.' The Final Report included a comprehensive
analysis of groundwater conditions, and the law and institutions that regulated
groundwater. z The Commission recognized that groundwater resources were
essential to meeting water supply demands. Despite its importance, groundwater
4was being managed in some regions of the state in an unsustainable manner.
These areas of the state were withdrawing significantly more water from the
groundwater basins than was being recharged, resulting in significant overdraft.5
This problem prompted the Commission to conclude that overdraft problems
were critical, and immediate comprehensive management reforms were needed.6
In response, the Commission made several recommendations to solve the
overdraft and other groundwater problems through changes in the law.7 The
Commission, noting that because groundwater conditions varied according to
region and that some regions already had significant local groundwater
management programs in place, recommended that local control of groundwater
be encouraged and expanded . The Commission specifically did not endorse a
statewide regulatory approach, which is common in most of the western states.9
* Senior Staff Counsel, California Department of Water Resources, Sacramento, California; Adjunct
Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law and Golden Gate University School of Law. A.B.,
1980, University of California, Davis; J.D., 1984, Santa Clara University School of Law; LL.M., 1987,
University of London, King's College. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not
represent the views of these entities.
1. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT (Dec.
1978) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
2. Id. at 136-48.
3. See ANNE J. SCHNEIDER, GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW,
GROUNDWATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA 1 (Staff Paper No. 2, July 1977). At the time, groundwater provided
approximately 15 million acre-feet of California's water needs, accounting for forty percent of the total state
supply. Id.
4. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 136.
5. See id. at 137. The Commission estimated in 1978 that average annual overdraft amounted to 2.2
million acre-feet per year. Id. at 140. The regions with significant overdraft included the San Joaquin and Tulare
groundwater basins. Id. at 137.
6. See id. at 135; see also id. at 165-69.
7. See generally id. at 165-250.
8. See id. at 145-46.
9. See id. at 146. Most western states follow the appropriative doctrine implemented with a state
administrative permit system. Id. at 166. Arizona and Montana have state administrative systems but do not
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The Commission reasoned that groundwater management required a flexible
response and that local agencies were best able to provide this. 10
Since publication of the Final Report, the California Legislature and courts
have followed the Commission's recommendations, if not intentionally, then
certainly in spirit, by giving local agencies significantly enhanced authority to
manage groundwater." In addition, large financial assistance programs to
provide funding for locals seeking to implement groundwater improvement
programs have been enacted, further transferring control over groundwater basins
to local agencies. 12 Even with these new regulations and programs in place,
significant overdraft, the fundamental problem relating to groundwater that
existed twenty-five years ago, still exists in certain groundwater basins in the
state and the problem does not appear to be diminishing. Indeed, the problem is
arguably even more acute given the cumulative effects of twenty-five years of
overdraft and the increased demand on water supplies due to a rapidly increasing
statewide population. Related to overdraft in some areas, groundwater quality has
also deteriorated in ways that were not fully anticipated by the Commission.
This article begins by describing the current status of groundwater resources
in California and the legal, financial, and institutional changes that have been
made to groundwater management since the Commission completed its work.13 It
continues by documenting the continuing movement toward local control, the
principal recommendation made by the Commission. '4 The article will explain
that although progress has been made to address problems discussed in the Final
Report, the measures have been insufficient to stop or even slow overdraft in
certain basins in the state.' 5 In addition, the decrease in groundwater quality in
some basins has emerged as another difficult challenge. 16 This article concludes
with some recommendations to address the continuing overdraft problem.17
follow appropriative rules. 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 24.02, at 405-14 (Robert E. Beck ed., rev. ed.
1991). California follows the correlative rights doctrine, which incorporates appropriative rules for non-
overlying land. See infra notes 46-53 and accompany text.
10. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 166.
11. See infra notes 86-124 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part H and lI.
14. See infra Part V. In 1994, fifteen years after the Final Report, several groundwater experts
recommended state control of groundwater because of the failures of local control to address the overdraft
problem. See, e.g., Eric L. Garner et al., Institutional Reforms in California Groundwater Law, 25 PAC. L.J.
1021, 1051-52 (1994). Despite their recommendation, locals have further consolidated control on groundwater
management as discussed in this article.
15. See infra Part V.
16. See infra Part IV. G.
17. See infra Part V.
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II. STATUS OF CALIFORNIA'S GROUNDWATER RESOURCES
California's groundwater supply has been described as California's "hidden
resource."' 8 As with anything that is out of sight, it can be argued that
groundwater is out of mind as well. The importance of these resources to meeting
California's water demand is probably not fully appreciated by the average water
user and state policy maker. The amount of groundwater in an area depends on
recharge from rainfall, surface runoff from streams, and local underground
geology. Recharge can be increased by importing surface water for groundwater
storage, by developing recharge basins or "ground water banks," and by pumping
water into the aquifer through injection wells.
At the time of the Final Report, the Commission recognized that annual
demand for surface and groundwater in California was 31 million acre-feet.
19
Groundwater met twenty-four percent of the state's total demand.20 The Final
Report recognized that California was also overdrafting several groundwater
basins in the state, eleven of which were in critical condition.2' Overdraft refers
to the condition of a groundwater basin in which the amount withdrawn by
pumping over a long-term period exceeds the amount of water recharged in the
basin. The Final Report estimated the total overdraft amount at 2.2 million-acre
22feet per year.
Since the Final Report was issued, California has experienced a spectrum of
hydrological conditions; with serious droughts from 1987-1992, very wet years
in 1983, 1986, and 1993, and average rainfall in other years.23 The importance of
groundwater in meeting California's enormous water demands, however, has not
generally changed since the time of the Final Report. Californians currently meet
24
about thirty percent of their urban and agricultural demands from groundwater.
18. DEP'T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA'S GROUNDWATER UPDATE 2003, at 20 (Bulletin 118)
[hereinafter BULLETIN 118-2003].
19. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 136. An acre-foot is the amount of water that will cover one acre of
land, one-foot deep. An acre-foot of water on average can supply water for two households for an entire year.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 137. Contemporaneously with the Commission's work, the Legislature directed the California
Department of Water Resources ("DWR"), the agency responsible for collecting groundwater data, to develop a
definition of critical overdraft and identify those groundwater basins in the state in a critical overdraft condition. In
response, the DWR held public workshops around the state and ultimately developed a definition of "critical
overdraft": "A basin is subject to critical conditions of overdraft when continuation of present water management
practices would probably result in significant adverse overdraft-related environmental, social, or economic
impacts." DEP'T OF WATER RES., GROUND WATER BASINS IN CALIFORNIA 3 (Bulletin 118-80) (1980). Using this
definition, the DWR identified eleven groundwater basins that were in conditions of critical overdraft. Id. This
definition is still currently used. The DWR has indicated that due to funding constraints these basins have not been
reevaluated since then, although there is a reasonable basis to presume that serious conditions continue to exist in
many, if not all, of these basins. BULLETIN 118-2003, supra note 18, at 98.
22. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 137.
23. DEP'T OF WATER RES., PREPARING FOR CALIFORNIA'S NExT DROUGHT: CHANGES SINCE 1987-92,
at 14 (2000).
24. BULLETIN 118-2003, supra note 18, at 24.
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This amount increases to forty percent during dry periods.25 During dry periods,
the construction of groundwater wells increases, as can be expected with a
reduction in surface supply. 26 The total amount of groundwater extracted in 1995
was approximately 14.5 million acre-feet, representing almost twenty percent of
the groundwater extracted in the entire United States.27
The groundwater overdraft problem continues today at roughly the same
level that existed at the time of the Final Report. The California Department of
Water Resources ("DWR") concluded, in its most recent bulletin on groundwater,
that overdraft is continuing at a rate of one million to two million acre-feet
annually. 28 Although this number is imprecise, certain basins within the state are
still showing a growing decline of groundwater levels.29 There is also concern
that the basins that have not overdrafted may show evidence of overdraft in the
future.30 Overdraft is not sustainable over time. If it is allowed to continue, there
is a strong potential for adverse impacts, including increased extraction and well
deepening costs, 3 1 land subsidence, water quality degradation, and environmental
impacts, such as loss of habitat due to lack of water.
32
Land subsidence has already occurred in some parts of the state, and is well
documented in the San Joaquin Valley. 33 Subsidence began when groundwater
pumping started in the 1920s and appears correlated with groundwater extractions
and surface water supplies.34 Subsidence declined as surface water supplies were
brought into the Valley in the 1970s through the State Water Project, but
increased again when those supplies declined during the droughts.35 Although
25. Id.
26. Id. at 27-28. The DWR determined that nearly 128,000 new wells were constructed from 1987-2000,
about 9,100 annually. Id. The DWR also found that well construction increased significantly during the 1987-
1992 drought, but then dropped when hydrological conditions improved. Id.
27. Id. at 20.
28. Id. at 2.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. Deeper wells require longer pump lifts. This, in turn, requires increased electricity to pump the
water. Some wells in the Central Valley are now installed to a depth of over 2,000 feet to reach water. For
agricultural water use, if pumping costs exceeds the economic benefit of the crop, then those irrigation wells are
ultimately abandoned.
32. BULLETIN 118-2003, supra note 18, at 2. The most famous groundwater overdrafted basin involving
habitat loss is the Edwards Basin in Texas. As groundwater pumping increased for urban use in San Antonio,
springs connected to the basins started to go dry, impacting species protected by the federal Endangered Species
Act. See Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 112 F.3d 789 (5th Cir. 1997). After a series of federal court cases,
Texas adopted a basin-wide groundwater management authority in response. S.B. 1477, 73d Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Tex. 1993).
33. See DEP'T OF WATER RES., 1 THE CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE 3-52 (Bulletin 160-98) (1998)
[hereinafter BULLETIN 160-98].
34. Id. A maximum of twenty-eight feet of subsidence was measured at one point in the San Joaquin
Valley. Id.
35. Id. Operated by the DWR, the State Water Project delivers on average 2.3 million acre-feet per year.
Deliveries depend in part on hydrological conditions. During the height of the 1987-1992 drought, the State
Water Project made severely limited deliveries to agricultural water users in 1991. DEP'T OF WATER RES.,
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some subsidence is elastic, meaning that ground levels can recover if water is
recharged, at a certain point the subsidence may become inelastic, permanently
losing part of the recharge and storage capacity of the land.36 When the resource
is damaged permanently, the groundwater extraction can no longer be merely
called overdraft, but would be more accurately described as "groundwater
mining."
Concerns about groundwater quality have greatly expanded since the Final Report.
These concerns include groundwater pollution caused by organic contaminants or by
saline intrusion. The link between groundwater quality and quantity is now
recognized by the state as a significant groundwater management issue that needs
more study.37 As levels drop, groundwater quality problems are exacerbated in
certain contaminated aquifers. If groundwater contamination is localized at a
limited number of well sites, it seldom has an impact on regional supplies, as
those wells may be taken out of production. 38 However, region-wide pollution
problems "such as organics in the San Gabriel Valley or nitrates in parts of the
San Joaquin Valley" require more coordinated management.39
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR GROUNDWATER
MANAGEMENT IN CALIFORNIA
At the time the Final Report was issued, the Commission observed that
California did not have a statewide groundwater regulatory system;4° this is an
anomaly among western states. 41 The lack of comprehensive statewide
regulations of groundwater continues today.42 Indeed, all western states except
MANAGEMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE WATER PROJECT 31 (Bulletin 132-92) (1992). This resulted in those
users relying extensively on groundwater resources to make up the difference.
36. BULLETIN 118-2003, supra note 18, at 100. The amount of lost recharge capacity is a function of the
level of subsidence. For large-scale groundwater withdrawals, the lost capacity can range from ten to thirty
percent. WILLIAM M. ALLEY ET AL., SUSTAINABILITY OF GROUND-WATER RESOURCES 55 (U.S. Geological
Survey Circular 1186) (1999). For aquifers with large capacity, it is arguable that a loss of capacity in this range
will not be missed, because there is still plenty of remaining capacity available for use.
37. See BULLETIN 118-2003, supra note 18, at 3.
38. BULLETIN 160-98, supra note 33, at 3-7 1.
39. Id.
40. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 145.
41. Most western states have a groundwater administrative permit system regulated by the state. The
administrative permit system usually requires an application be submitted to the state agency before a new well
is constructed. The permitting agency has discretionary authority over the application and usually issuance rests
in part on whether the proposed use is beneficial. The permit is usually conditional. See WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 414-21.
42. The California State Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB") regulates the limited amount of
groundwater that exists as "subterranean streams flowing through known and definite channels." CAL. WATER
CODE § 1200 (West 1971). This term is ambiguous to say the least and has been the subject of contention. In
2002, the SWRCB completed a report that analyzed the scope of the authority of the SWRCB over this type of
groundwater. The report generated significant controversy because it recommended expanding the state's role in
regulating groundwater where connected to surface water. See generally JOSEPH L. SAX, REVIEW OF THE LAWS
ESTABLISHING THE SWRCB's PERMITTING AUTHORITY OVER APPROPRIATIONS OF GROUNDWATER
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Texas, have a state administrative permit system. Groundwater users in
California are permitted to use groundwater consistent with the common law
rules unless they were governed by special local rules.
California has developed a set of common law principles establishing and
allocating rights among groundwater users. Unchanged from the time of the Final
Report, California follows the correlative rights doctrine to allocate rights among
competing groundwater users.43 This correlative rights doctrine establishes a
priority system among California groundwater users based on whether the land
on which the water is used overlies the basin.44 The doctrine recognizes two
types of users: overlying users whose property lies above the groundwater basin
and appropriators who take water outside the basin to use on non-overlying
property.45
Overlying groundwater users have priority in this system.46 Appropriators
may only take water that is surplus to the needs of overliers.47 They are junior to
all overlying users, and if there is insufficient supply to satisfy both overlying
users and appropriators, appropriators must curtail their use first.48 If there is
insufficient supply to meet the demands of all the appropriators, prior
appropriation principles apply.49 Under these principles, an appropriator that
started groundwater use first has superior rights, known as "senior rights," to
appropriators that begin their use later and have "junior rights." 50 Junior
appropriators must curtail their use, with the last appropriators on the system
curtailing first, until there is a sufficient supply to meet the needs of the
remaining appropriators. 51 After all appropriators are curtailed and there is still
CLASSIFIED AS SUBTERRANEAN STREAMS AND THE SWRCB's IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE LAWS, FINAL
REPORT (Jan. 19, 2002), available at http://www.waterrights.ca.gov/hearings/saxreport/SubStreamRpt(2002-01-
20).pdf (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Ultimately, the SWRCB decided not to implement the
recommendations in the report. The fact that SWRCB did not attempt to exercise it jurisdiction to regulate
groundwater connected to surface water (albeit only a limited share of the state's total groundwater resources)
further supports the proposition that local control remains the preferred vehicle to manage California's
groundwater.
43. See Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903). There are three other major groundwater rights
systems in the United States: absolute ownership, reasonable use, and appropriators. Under absolute ownership,
a property owner may use water both on overlying and non-overlying property, even to the point of causing
harm to neighboring users. The reasonable use doctrine requires that water be used on overlying property. The
owner may use the water to the point of harming other users in the basin. Appropriators may use water on both
overlying and non-overlying property. When there is insufficient supply to meet all appropriators' needs, use is
restricted based on a priority system. WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 115-287, 393-462.
44. See Katz, 74 P. at 772.
45. Municipalities that operate their own water system within their boundaries do not exercise overlying rights
except on their property such as parks and schools. City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 198 P. 784, 792 (Cal.
1921). Except for their properties, municipalities thus act as an appropriator and would be junior to all overlying users.
46. Katz, 74 P. at 772.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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an insufficient supply for all overlying users within a basin, water is shared
proportionally among overlying users.52 This may require pumping curtailment to
protect the basin if groundwater levels drop too low.
With its overlying and non-overlying distinction, the correlative rights doctrine
does not recognize the value of the particular use. For instance, a more valuable non-
overlying use, even if it started first, would have to be curtailed in favor of a less
valuable overlying use. Because of these inequities, the Commission recommended
that the legislature modify the correlative rights doctrine in favor of equitable
principles to allow flexibility for the courts in resolving groundwater disputes.53 The
Legislature has not followed this recommendation.
Similarly, the courts have refused to significantly depart from the correlative
rights doctrine. One court found that, unlike certain surface water users, overlying
owners with unexercised water rights cannot have their rights be made junior to
appropriators through groundwater adjudications, lawsuits filed to settle all water
rights within a basin.54 Recently, the California Supreme Court reviewed the
application of the correlative rights doctrine in City of Barstow v. Mojave Water
Agency.5" One of the appropriators in the basin had argued that the court could
allocate water within the basin using equitable principles. 56 The court rejected this
argument, finding that courts may not deviate from the correlatives rights doctrine
without first expressly considering the application of the doctrine when solving an
overdraft dispute.
5 7
Although the correlative rights doctrine sets forth a priority system among
groundwater users, the reality is that this system plays a small role in groundwater
management within the state. This doctrine only comes into effect when there is a
dispute among groundwater users and one of the users attempts to resolve the dispute
through an adjudication. Even in a situation where a basin is in a condition of
overdraft, this doctrine will not apply until a lawsuit is filed by one of the competing
users.5 8 Without such a lawsuit, all users can continue their use unabated.59
52. Id.
53. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 169, 237-39.
54. See Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. 740 (Ct. App. 1985). The California Supreme Court
has ruled that riparian users for surface streams may have their water rights priority reduced if it has not been
exercised in a statutory adjudication. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, 599 P.2d 656 (Cal.
1979). Riparian users are similar to overlying users to the extent their water rights are based on land ownership
near the water resource and are not subject to an administrative permit system. Distinguishing Long Valley, the
Wright court reasoned that the Legislature, unlike for surface water, had not adopted a statewide scheme
regulating groundwater. Wright, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 748-49. Consequently, the court followed a strict
interpretation of the correlative rights doctrine to protect common law priorities. Id. at 750.
55. 5 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000).
56. Id. at 865.
57. Id. at 869-70. The court did not expressly state under what circumstances, if any, courts may deviate
from the correlative rights doctrine. This subject will likely be the focus of the next, yet to be filed groundwater
adjudication.
58. In some states, there are specific statutory prohibitions against overdraft. California does not have
such statutes. However, overdraft could potentially run contrary to Article X, Section 2 of the California
Constitution, which requires that all water use in the state, including groundwater, be reasonable and beneficial.
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There are currently nineteen adjudicated basins in California, most of which
are located in Southern California.60 Six of these adjudicated basins have been
added since the publication of the Final Report. The goal of all groundwater
adjudications is to resolve disputes among competing users within the basin by
establishing a set of rules that will allow sustainable use of the basin. The
adjudicated basins all operate according to unique rules developed through the
adjudication. Typically, the judgment resulting from an adjudication establishes
priority among users with specifically defined pumping limits and creates user
committees or appoints a water master to monitor compliance and resolve
disputes. 61 Although adjudications have proven to be useful in managing groundwater
for a sizable population in Southern California, they have limited use statewide. The
nineteen adjudicated basins account for a small percentage of California's groundwater
resources. The limiting factor for adjudication continues to be the cost and delay
associated with groundwater litigation, which is adversarial rather than
collaborative and often involves numerous parties and complex groundwater
science.62
The State Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB") has authority to
initiate groundwater adjudications on behalf of the state to protect groundwater
quality, 63 but this authority has never been used. Such action by the SWRCB
would be contrary to the movement towards consolidating local groundwater
control and it is probably because of local resistance that the SWRCB has yet to
use this authority.
CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2. It can be argued that groundwater use that is causing overdraft at some point becomes
unreasonable, particularly when the overdraft causes permanent damage to the aquifer.
59. As the Commission reported, "California's groundwater is usually available to any pumper, public
or private, who wants to extract it, regardless of the impact of extraction on neighborhood groundwater pumpers
or on the general community." FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 136.
60. BULLETIN 118-2003, supra note 18, at 42-43. These basins are the Scott River Stream System, Santa
Paula Basin, Central Basin, West Coast Basin, Upper Los Angeles River Basin, Raymond Basin, Main San
Gabriel Basin, Puente, Cummings Basin, Tehachapi Basin, Brite Basin, Mojave Basin Area Adjudication,
Warren Valley Basin, Chino Basin, Cucamonga Basin, San Bernardino Basin Area, Six Basins, Santa Margarita
River Watershed, and Goleta. Id.
61. For an example of the tools used to manage a groundwater basin, see the Mojave Water Agency
website at www.mojavewater.org. The Mojave River Basin was the subject of the California Supreme Court's
decision in City ofBarstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000).
62. The first basin-wide adjudication was in the Raymond Basin in Southern California. It took thirteen
years to resolve, and ultimately ended in the California Supreme Court. See City of Pasadena v. City of
Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1949). The Supreme Court ruled in City of Pasadena, applying the prescriptive
rights doctrine, that strict rules of the correlative rights doctrine need not be followed where there were
numerous users in the basin, all pumping adverse to each other for a period of time. Id. at 32-33. The
prescriptive rights doctrine allows for the acquisition of water rights based on use that is adverse to other legal
users. Several decades later, the Supreme Court retreated from this holding in City of Los Angeles v. City of San
Fernando holding that California Civil Code section 1007 precluded the application of the prescriptive rights
doctrine. 537 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1975). The court also indicated in a footnote that an equitable apportionment of
water, rather than a strict following of the correlative rights doctrine, may be appropriate. Id. at 1298 n.61.
63. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2100-2102 (West 1971). Before the SWRCB may initiate the adjudication,
the DWR or local government agency must perform an investigation to provide the factual basis for the lawsuit.
Id. § 2101.
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Because of the limited usefulness of groundwater adjudications and the lack
of a statewide groundwater regulatory scheme, the Commission recommended
that local control of groundwater be encouraged and expanded.64 Consistent with
this recommendation, local agency groundwater management, as opposed to state
management or no management, has been the choice in California since the Final
Report was issued, albeit with varying degrees of success. The two primary
methods of local groundwater control are the county groundwater management
ordinance and local water agency regulation.
Although local groundwater ordinances existed before publication of the
Final Report, the impetus for creation of such ordinances greatly expanded after
the California Court of Appeal decided in Baldwin v. County of Tehama65 that
local governments have the authority, pursuant to its police power, to regulate
groundwater users. 66 Operating under the theory that groundwater management,
as well as nature, abhors a vacuum, the Baldwin court concluded that because the
state had not adopted a statewide system to regulate groundwater use, local
governments with police powers had authority to regulate groundwater users
within their boundaries.67
There are currently twenty-seven counties that have adopted groundwater
ordinances within the state. 68 Three counties, including Glenn County, aim to
manage their groundwater basin to account for users needs both inside and
outside the county. However, the remaining counties have not attempted to
restrict overdraft or establish management objectives for the basins. Instead, their
ordinances only serve to restrict the exportation of groundwater from the basin.
69
In such counties, it is unlawful to export groundwater outside of the county or
use groundwater in lieu of exported surface water without an extraction permit
issued by the county Board of Supervisors ("Board") and without first complying
with the California Environmental Quality Act. 0 The Board typically has
64. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 166-69.
65. 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886 (Ct. App. 1994).
66. Id. at 891. Under the California Constitution, counties and cities have police power authority to
make laws to regulate the health, safety, and welfare of their residents. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7. Counties and
cities are prohibited from enacting ordinances that are in conflict with general state law. Id.
67. Baldwin, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 890-91.
68. BuLLETiN 118-2003, supra note 18, at 39. The counties are Butte, Calaveras, Colusa, Fresno, Glenn,
Imperial, Inyo, Kern, Lake, Lassen, Madera, Mendocino, Modoc, Mono, Monterey, Napa, Sacramento, San
Benito, San Bernardino, San Diego, San Joaquin, Shasta, Sierra, Siskiyou, Tehama, Tuolumne, and Yolo.
69. Many of these counties have similar language in their ordinances and it appears that the ordinances
derive from similar sources. See Ellen Hanak, Who Should be Allowed to Sell Water in California? Third-Party
Issues and the Water Market, PUB. POL'Y INSTITUTE OF CAL., at 25-30 (2003).
70. See id. at 29-30. The California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"), CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§§ 21000-21177 (West 1996 & Supp. 2004), requires any state or local agency carrying out a project impacting
the environment to review and mitigate where possible the environmental impacts associated with the project.
Id. § 21001. "Project" is defined broadly in CEQA to include the issuance of permits. Id. § 21065. A
groundwater export permit thus would be subject to the CEQA process. The county would act as the lead
agency, meaning it would be responsible for creating the appropriate environmental document, either an
environmental impact report, a negative declaration, or an exemption reviewing the environmental impacts of
the export. The county also has the responsibility to adopt appropriate mitigation measures.
479
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discretionary authority over the issuance of the permit and the permit may be
issued only if the Board first determines that the export will not cause overdraft,
will not affect safe yield, and will not injure water users within the county.71
These export ordinances have been adopted by both rural and groundwater rich
counties, many in Northern California, out of concern that their groundwater
resources will be exported to meet the growing demands of the Bay Area and
Southern California. The concerns about out-of-county exports are typified by the
scenario that someone could purchase land within a county with groundwater
resources for purposes of obtaining groundwater rights, and then, transfer water
outside of the county for a fee to the detriment of users within the county.72
Alternatively, an overlying landowner may simply decide to transfer the groundwater
supplies out of the basin through a contract with an export user. Based on the
correlative rights doctrine, such exporters would be considered appropriators and
thus could only use water that was surplus to all overlying users within the county.
However, the ability to restrict out-of-county use by relying on the appropriative
doctrine through adjudication is perceived to be limited.73
There are problems with this approach to groundwater management, especially if
it is the only management tool used in that basin. Because of the enormous political
pressure on the boards of supervisors to keep all groundwater within their respective
counties, an export permit application may be denied even if the exports do not
adversely affect local water needs. This could interfere with groundwater exports that
would enhance the statewide water supply without causing local effects. This is of
special concern because of California's growing population and increasing water
demands. Moreover, export-restricting ordinances do not attempt to regulate in-
county use even if it is causing overdraft or groundwater quality problems.
Groundwater exports have also been restricted by an area of origin law
known as the "protected areas law," adopted by the California Legislature in
1984. 74 Area of origin laws, several of which existed prior to 1984, are intended
to protect water rich regions from exports.75 Previously enacted area of origin
laws protect against surface water exports from watersheds or counties with
surplus water. The protected areas law applies to both surface and groundwater
resources within defined watersheds. It protects important groundwater basins in
71. See, e.g., YOLO, CAL., CODE tit. 10, ch. 7, § 10-7.305 (1996).
72. For example, in Yolo County, the Board of Supervisors has authorized the filing of an eminent
domain action against a large agricultural landowner out of concern the owner may export water outside of the
county. Elisabeth Sherwin, County OKs Eminent Domain, THE DAVIS ENTERPRISE, July 9, 2004, at 1. This
concern is part and parcel of California's history of water exports outside a region. It started with the City of
Los Angeles' acquisition and export of water within the Owens Valley in the early part of the twentieth century
and is still prevalent today. See NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST 531-32 (rev. ed. 2001).
73. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
74. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1215-1222 (West Supp. 2004).
75. There are several types of area of origin laws for surface water. For a comparison of area of origin laws, see
David A. Sandino, Protecting Local Water Supplies from Eport: Comparison and Analysis of California's Area of
Origin Laws, 2000 CAL ENVTL L. RPrR. 349 (Dec. 2000).
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the Central Valley, specifically those found in the Sacramento, Mokelumne,
Calaveras, and San Joaquin River watersheds, as well as the Sacramento-San
Joaquin Bay-Delta.76
Under the protected areas law, groundwater appropriations exported out of
the protected area initiated after January 1, 1985 may not deprive groundwater
users of "the prior right to all the water reasonably required to adequately supply
the beneficial needs of the protected area."77 The full scope of this statute is
uncertain because terms like "prior rights," "reasonably required," and "adequately
supply the beneficial needs" are ambiguous and have not been analyzed in a reported
case. However, similar wording is used in another area of origin law known as the
"watershed protection statute. ' 8
The watershed protection statute applies specifically to surface water diversions
by the two major water projects: the State Water Project and the federal Central
Valley Project.79 The meaning of this area of origin statute has not been analyzed by
a reported court decision, but it was analyzed in an influential 1955 California
Attorney General opinion. 80 According to the Attorney General, when a water user
within the area of origin makes an application for a surface water appropriative right,
the water user is assigned a higher priority than the two major projects, even if the
projects had perfected their water rights earlier.81 This interpretation, if applied to the
protected areas law, would modify the correlative rights doctrine by limiting
appropriators to water that is not only surplus to the overlying users in the basin, but
to water that is surplus to the reasonable water needs of the entire watershed.
The groundwater area of origin laws also grant water users within a protected
area the right to contract for a water supply from the exporter, provided they pay
adequate compensation to the exporter.82 The exporter is required to negotiate
contract terms in good faith with the water users within the protected area, and this
good faith obligation is enforceable in court.83
76. CAL. WATER CODE § 1215.5. Outside of the Central Valley, the protected areas law protects the
Mono Lake, Truckee, Walker, Carson, and Russian River systems. Id. The effect of the protected areas law on
surface water appropriations is limited, because it only applies to appropriations after January 1, 1985. Id.
§ 1215. For most of these systems, significant exports out of the watershed occurred before that date, and thus
would not be affected by the law.
77. Id. § 1216.
78. Id. § 11460 (West 1992). In language that parallels Water Code section 1216, section 11460 provides:
In the construction and operation by the department of any project under the provisions of this part a
watershed or area wherein water originates, or an area immediately adjacent thereto which can
conveniently be supplied with water therefrom, shall not be deprived by the department directly or
indirectly of the prior right to all of the water reasonably required to adequately supply the beneficial
needs of the watershed, area, or any of the inhabitants or property owners therein.
Id.
79. Id. § 11128.
80. 25 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 8, 24 (1955).
81. Id.
82. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1217(a), 1219.5 (West Supp. 2004). No reported contract has yet been
completed pursuant to these sections.
83. Id. § 1217(b)-(c).
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While the Commission did not mention it directly, the protected areas law
represents another example of increased local groundwater control. Although this
law does not require express approval of local agencies for exports outside the area,
like county export ordinances, the practical effect is similar. This law makes it
difficult for appropriators outside the area to start new pumping within a protected
basin without first demonstrating that the water supply needs of the protected area are
being met. In overdrafted basins, the ability to start a new appropriation for export
and still "adequately supply the beneficial needs' '4 would appear impossible,
because overdrafted basins are, by definition, in danger of being unable to provide an
inadequate supply to water users in the basin.
8 5
IV. EXPANSION OF LOCAL AGENCY GROUNDWATER
MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY
Since the adoption of the Final Report, and consistent with its recommendation,
the real improvement concerning groundwater management in California has
occurred through a significant expansion of the express authority granted to local
agencies over groundwater management. In the last twenty-five years, the
Legislature has enacted a host of laws giving local agencies more authority to
manage groundwater and, in some cases, requiring them to take specific action.
In addition, the Legislature and the voters have provided financial incentives to
improve groundwater management.
A. Districts With Groundwater Management Authority Created Under General
Enabling Statutes
Over twenty different types of local agencies have been granted authority to
manage groundwater.8 6 These agencies, numbering more than two thousand,
include irrigation districts, water conservation districts, water districts, county
service areas, community services districts, and water storage districts.8 7 The
scope of authority of a particular local agency depends on the general district
84. Id. § 1216.
85. Several of the critical overdrafted basins are within watersheds protected by the area of origin laws:
Eastern San Joaquin County Basin, Chowchilla Basin, Madera Basin, and possibly the Kaweaha, Tulare, and
Tule basins. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Certain exports from the Eastern San Joaquin Basin are
not subject to the area of origin requirements provided the exports are made consistent with San Joaquin County
ordinances regulating groundwater. CAL. WATER CODE § 1220(d).
86. BuLLETIN 118-2003, supra note 18, at 33. Local district law in general is a complicated maze of
rules, including those pertaining to the purposes of the district, formation requirements, voting requirements,
size and qualification of the governing board, eminent domain authorities, and assessment powers. For an
analysis of the local agencies with authority relating to water, including groundwater management, see
generally DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, GENERAL COMPARISON OF WATER DISTRICT ACTs (Bulletin
155-94) (1994).
87. BULLETIN 118-2003, supra note 18, at 34.
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enabling legislation under which the agency was created.88 For instance, water
replenishment districts are authorized to establish groundwater replenishment
programs to both address overdraft and to collect fees for that service.89 Water
conservation districts are authorized to levy groundwater extraction fees.
90
Since the adoption of the Final Report, the Legislature has expanded the
power of these districts. In the case of water replenishment districts, the
Legislature has given them specific powers to protect groundwater quality.9'
B. Special Districts Created for Groundwater Management
Since the Final Report was adopted, the Legislature has embraced a new tool
in managing groundwater. Consistent with the move to local management, the
Legislature created seven special districts for groundwater management: Sierra
Valley Water Management District,92  Honey Lake Valley Groundwater
Management District,93 Long Valley Groundwater Management District,94 Mono
County Tri-Valley Groundwater Management District,95 Ojai Basin Groundwater
Management Agency,96 Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency,97 and
Willow Creek Valley Groundwater Management District.98 This approach
represents the state-of-the-art in local groundwater management. Because these
districts are created by the Legislature, they do not have to go through the
formation requirements, such as signature and voting requirements, of local
agencies created through general district law. In addition, the Legislature has
88. Malaga County Water District, for instance, was created under the County Water District Act. CAL.
WATER CODE §§ 30000-33901. It has been given specific powers pertaining to groundwater charges used for
groundwater replenishment. Id. § 31144.76.
89. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 60221, 60230 (West 2004). There is one water replenishment district in
the state, the Central and West Basin Water Replenishment District. BULLETIN 118-2003, supra note 18, at 34.
The district's authority to store groundwater was recently analyzed by a California Court of Appeal. See Cent.
& W. Basin Water Replenishment Dist. v. S. Cal. Water Co. 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486 (Ct. App. 2003). The ability
of the district to manage the groundwater basin was challenged by entities with adjudicated groundwater rights
within the basin. Id. at 489. Besides wanting their rights to natural groundwater, these entities wanted the right
to make use of the storage space within the basin for conjunctive use programs. Id. at 492. The court rejected
their request, finding that their adjudicated rights to the natural groundwater did not give them rights to the
storage space. Id. at 499. Instead, the district has the authority to operate conjunctive use programs and to
manage the storage space within the basin. Id. at 503-04.
90. CAL. WATER CODE § 74508 (West 2004). There are thirteen water conservation districts in the state.
BULLETIN 118-2003, supra note 18, at 34.
91. CAL. WATER CODE § 60224 (West 2004).
92. Id. app. ch. 119 (West 1995).
93. Id. app. ch. 129.
94. Id. app. ch. 119. The Legislature has provided for the creation of a groundwater management district
in the Long Valley Groundwater Basin by a joint exercise of power agreement between Sierra and Lassen
counties. These counties may also enter in an agreement for the purposes of groundwater management with the
state of Nevada, the county of Washoe, or both. Id. app. § 119-1301.
95. Id. app. ch. 128.
96. Id. app. ch. 131.
97. Id. app. ch. 121.
98. Id. app. ch. 135.
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been able to design specific authority for these districts depending on the
groundwater problems in each area.
Although each special district has different authorities, they have many
similarities as well. Districts have been given the authority to control in-basin
pumping upon evidence, or threat, of overdraft. 99 In the event of overdraft, the
available water supply is equitably allocated, but based primarily on the number of
acres owned by a particular user.1 Similar to county export ordinances, districts
have been given express authority to limit exports out of the district.l01 Districts also
have well spacing authority to minimize well interference, similar to the restrictions
imposed on oil wells. 10 2 They can also levy fees for groundwater management
activities and for water supply replenishment.'
03
These districts have been successful in addressing their groundwater
problems, and are useful models to be considered for use in other parts of the
state. However, the fact that their approach has only been used in a few regions
suggests that it is difficult to achieve a political consensus within the Legislature
to adopt such an aggressive management technique. This model thus remains
only a remote possibility for some of the significantly overdrafted basins, such as
those in the San Joaquin Valley, famous for its lack of political consensus on
groundwater.
C. Groundwater Management through Local Planning: AB 3030
In 1991, the California Legislature authorized local agencies overlying basins
subject to critical overdraft, as determined by the DWR, to establish groundwater
management within their service areas. °4 These agencies were provided powers
similar to those of water replenishment districts to manage the basins for the
purposes of extraction, recharge, conveyance, and water quality control.105 Seven
local agencies have adopted plans under this authority.10 6
This concept of proactive local management was expanded to all agencies
through the adoption of Assembly Bill 3030 ("AB 3030").107 This is the most
significant legislation consolidating local control over groundwater. It greatly
expanded the number of local agencies that could write groundwater management
99. See, e.g., id. app. § 119-709. Most importantly, the failure to comply with restrictions imposed by
the district may result in civil penalties in the amount of $1000 per day. Id. app. § 119-603.
100. See, e.g., id. app. § 119-709.5.
101. See, e.g., id. app. § 119-706.
102. See, e.g., id. app. § 119-703.
103. See, e.g., id app. §§ 119-802 to 119-803.
104. A.B. 255, 1991 Cal. Stat. ch. 903.
105. BULLETIN 118-2003, supra note 18, at 35.
106. Id.
107. 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 947 (enacting the Groundwater Management Act codified at CAL. WATER CODE
§§10750-10755.4 (West Supp. 2004)).
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plans, which are known by those in the field as "AB 3030 plans."'0 8 The purpose of
this legislation was to encourage local agencies to take more active roles in
groundwater management.' °9 The implicit threat by the Legislature at the time
AB 3030 was adopted was that if local agencies did not adequately manage local
resources, the state, through another round of legislation, would force them to do
SO.
Except for the adjudicated basins, all basins within the state could be subject
to AB 3030 plans."0 Furthermore, "local agency" is broadly defined as an agency
that provides some type of water service within the area."' This has been
interpreted to include cities, counties, irrigation districts, water districts, and
water storage districts. If a district providing water service, including reclamation
and water replenishment districts, does not act, then any district providing flood
control, groundwater management, or groundwater replenishment can adopt a
plan,." 2 By not naming a specific local agency to be responsible for preparing the
plan, the Legislature gave latitude to local areas to find a willing agency.
The Legislature encouraged, but did not mandate, local agencies within the
same groundwater basin to prepare coordinated plans. 13 Since local agency
boundaries do not parallel groundwater basins, a lack of coordination could be a
serious problem. AB 3030 sets forth a public procedure for the preparation and
adoption of the plan.' 4 It outlines twelve components, including mitigation of
overdraft, groundwater replenishment, groundwater level monitoring, and control
of the migration of contaminated groundwater." 
5
Once a plan is adopted, the local agency may enact regulations to implement the
plan, but the authority to curtail overdraft by limiting extraction has been
restricted.116 Upon adoption of the plan, the local agency is given the same authority
as a water replenishment district-to fix and collect fees and assessments for
groundwater management.1 7 Before a local agency may limit or suspend extractions,
it must first determine, through an investigation, that alternative sources of water are
infeasible to lessen the demand for groundwater.1 8 Any restriction imposed is
108. CAL. WATER CODE § 10750.
109. Id.
110. Id. § 10750.2.
111. Id. § 10752(g).
112. Id. § 10753(b).
113. Id. § 10755.2.
114. After holding a public hearing, the local agency first adopts a resolution stating its intention to
adopt a plan. Id. §§ 10753.2. The agency then has two years to complete the plan and public input is required
during the process. Id. § 10753.4. After the plan is completed, a second hearing is held to determine whether to
adopt the plan. Id. § 10753.5(a). Those who disagree with the plan may file a protest. Id. § 10753.5(b). If the
local agency determines that fifty percent of the assessed value of the property protests the plan, it may not be
adopted. Id. § 10753.6(c)(1)-(2).
115. Id. § 10738.
116. Id. § 10753.9.
117. Id. § 10754-10754.3.
118. Id. § 10753.9(c).
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expressly not to be considered a modification of the water right.11 9 Thus, any
cessation of extraction cannot be viewed as forfeiture or abandonment of the right.
About two hundred local agencies have completed AB 3030 plans. 120 AB 3030
serves the important purpose of encouraging local entities to be more active in their
groundwater management while also increasing public awareness about the
importance of groundwater resources. 121 However, due to the lack of mandated
implementation requirements and a state clearinghouse agency to review the plans,
122
the actual improvement in groundwater management effectuated by AB 3030 is
difficult to ascertain. Responding to this deficiency, the Legislature has requires all
local agencies with AB 3030 plans have certain components in the plans when
seeking financial assistance from the state after 2002.123 However, this is a limited
reform, and does not mandate that local agencies implement the plans, even in
overdrafted basins.' 
24
D. State Programs Providing Funds to Local Agencies for Groundwater
Projects
Another way to promote local management of groundwater is to offer
financial incentives to local agencies to encourage them to implement specific
groundwater management or improvement programs. Even though it was not
contemplated by the Final Report, California has recently adopted several bond
measures that include significant funding for groundwater improvement
programs. 125 This approach represents the growing movement within the water
community to move away from regulatory management or water rights disputes
toward a cooperative approach with funds used as a carrot to achieve the desired
results. 1
26
119. Id.§ 10753.1.
120. Gary Pitzer, California Groundwater: Managing a Hidden Resource, W. WATER, July-Aug. 2003,
at 4,9.
121. Id.
122. CAL. WATER CODE § 10750.4. The DWR concluded that some of the plans have had little or no
implementation. BULLETIN 118-2003, supra note 18, at 44.
123. CAL. WATER CODE §10753.7(a). Funds from the Groundwater Management Act of 2000 are
excluded from this requirement. Id.
124. Id.
125. See infra text accompanying notes 127-131.
126. As an example, the SWRCB completed the recent iteration of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Bay-
Delta hearings, which allocated responsibility to meet the water quality objectives in the Delta. See S.W.R.C.B.,
Revised Water Right Decision 1641 (2000). The ultimate phase of the hearing pertaining to the allocation of
responsibility to meet the objectives was settled through provision of funding to Northern California water users
to study and potentially provide newly developed supplies to the export users. In return, export water users
agreed to fund the studies and to pay for any developed supplies. SHORT-TERM AGREEMENT TO GUIDE
IMPLEMENTATION OF SHORT-TERM WATER MANAGEMENT ACTIONS TO MEET LOCAL WATER SUPPLY NEEDS
AND TO MAKE WATER AVAtLABLE TO THE SWP AND CVP TO ASSIST IN MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
1995 WATER QUALITY CONTROL PLAN AND TO RESOLVE PHASE 8 ISSUES (2002) (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
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Assembly Bill 303, the Local Groundwater Management Assistance Act of
2000, provided $21 million in grants to local entities for groundwater studies or
management activities. 127 In 2000, the voters approved Proposition 13, the Safe
Drinking Water, Clean Water, Watershed Protection, and Flood Protection
Act, 128 which authorized $230 million for groundwater storage facilities and
conjunctive management programs. 29 The DWR administers this program.130
The DWR has awarded the grant money to local agencies to plan, design, and
build conjunctive use facilities. The voters approved yet another bond measure,
Proposition 50, in 2002, the Water Security, Clean Drinking Water, Coastal
Beach Protection Act of 2002, for which $500 million may be used for water
management programs, including groundwater management and groundwater
recharge projects. 31
E. Expansion of Local Authority to Implement Conjunctive Use Projects
The Final Report recommended an expansion of local conjunctive use projects,
projects that link groundwater and surface water together to provide maximum water
supply.132 To help accomplish this, the Final Report recommended that the common
law rules protecting groundwater storage be codified to better protect the water rights
of those entities implementing these programs.' 33 Although the Legislature did not
adopt the specific statutory changes recommended by the Commission, it made
statutory changes in 1992 that have benefited local conjunctive use programs.' 34
The Legislature stated that it "was the policy of the state to encourage
conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater supplies and to make surface water
available for other beneficial uses.' 35 To implement this policy, the Legislature
attempted to clarify that those participating in conjunctive use programs could not
lose their rights through non-use.
136
California surface water appropriations, unlike groundwater, are regulated
through a statewide permit system. California recognizes two major types of surface
water rights, riparian and appropriative. Riparian rights are based on the ownership
of property next to a river or lake. Appropriative rights, conversely, are based on
127. A.B. 303, 2000 Cal. Stat. ch. 708 (codified at CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10795-10795.20 (West
2004)).
128. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 79000-79221 (West 2004).
129. Id. §§ 79161, 79565. Thirty million was allocated to groundwater recharge programs and studies
and two hundred million for conjunctive use projects. Id. § 79161. The proposition established a maximum of
$50 million for any conjunctive use program. Id.
130. Id.
131. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 79560-79565.
132. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 155.
133. Id. at 169, 231-36.
134. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1011.5 (West Supp. 2004).
135. Id. § 1011.5(a).
136. Id. § 1011.5(b).
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putting water to beneficial use and are regulated through a permit system. This
permit system follows a priority system, similar to groundwater appropriators.
137
Surface water right holders who do not put water to beneficial use for a five-year
period face the possibility of losing those water rights through forfeiture.'38 The
rationale behind forfeiture is that water should be put to beneficial consumptive use.
If a water user cannot make use of the water, then arguably the water right is
unneeded and should be forfeited. 1
39
The possibility of losing water rights discouraged groundwater conjunctive use,
because surface water users who stopped using water during periods when they were
relying on groundwater risked forfeiting their surface water rights. To eliminate this
concern, the Legislature enacted a law providing that decrease in surface water use as
a result of substituting groundwater in a conjunctive use program would be
considered a beneficial use and such change cannot be used as a basis for
forfeiture.1
40
To further encourage conjunctive use, the Legislature also made it possible to
transfer water that had been saved as result of a conjunctive use program.1 41 This
provision is consistent with the growing trend that has developed since the Final Report
to treat water more like a freely transferable commodity.142 Conjunctive use programs
have also been promoted through recent bond programs and through federal assistance.
With these incentives, conjunctive water management have expanded significantly
since the Final Report was issued. At least a dozen conjunctive use programs are in
place throughout the state and more are in the works. 143 However, not all proposed
conjunctive use programs are implemented. One of the more controversial conjunctive
use programs, the Cadiz Water Storage and Dry-year Supply Program, in San
Bernardino County, was ultimately rejected by Cadiz's partner and user of the water,
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California. 144
137. For a discussion of the appropriative system, see MARYBELLE D. ARCHIBALD, GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, APPROPRIATIVE WATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA 1 -
2 (Staff Paper No. 1, May 1977).
138. CAL. WATER CODE § 1241 (West 1971 & Supp. 2004).
139. Critics of forfeiture say it encourages waste of water and discourages water conservation through
promoting a "use it or lose it" mentality. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
140. CAL. WATER CODE § 1011.5. The Legislature adopted a similar statute for recycled water and
appropriative rights not exercised in the context of a conjunctive use program. Id. §§ 1010-1011.
141. Id. § 1011.5(d).
142. See generally Kevin M. O'Brien, Water Marketing in California, 19 PAC. L.J. 1165 (1988); Kevin
M. O'Brien & Robert R. Gunning, Water Marketing in California Revisited: The Legacy of the 1987-92
Drought, 25 PAC. L. J. 1053 (1994).
143. DEP'T OF WATER RES., 1 CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE 103-105 (Bulletin 160-93) (1994)
[hereinafter BULLETIN 160-93]. Conjunctive use programs have been implemented by Alameda County Water
District, Kern County, Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, Orange County Water District, Santa
Clara Valley Water District, South Sutter Water District, United Water Conservation District, Westlands Water
District, and Yolo County Flood Control and Water Conservation District. Id. For a detailed look at a
conjunctive use program implemented by Arvin-Edison Water Storage District in Kern County, see Sue
McClurg, Maximizing Groundwater Supplies, WESTERN WATER, May-June 1996, at 4,10.
144. The Cadiz project, located near the Mojave Desert, would have stored water from the Colorado
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 36
F. Transfer of the Kern Water Bank from State to Local Control
Groundwater institutional changes have also favored local control. No
groundwater program in the last twenty-five years illustrates this more clearly
than the Kern Water Bank.145 In 1985, the Legislature authorized the DWR to
add the southern Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta storage facilities to the State
Water Project. 46 The DWR conceived the Kern Water Bank in 1987, and it was
endorsed by the Legislature as a state solution to California's need for additional
water storage. 147 As proposed by the DWR, the Kern Water Bank was to be a
State Water Project conjunctive use facility consisting of 20,000 acres (about
thirty-one square miles) in Kern County near Interstate Highway 5 for use as a
groundwater storage and extraction facility. The DWR estimated that the Kern
Water Bank could store as much as one million acre-feet of water, an amount
equivalent to a large reservoir. The Bank was located near the Kern River and the
California Aqueduct. The DWR considered this location ideal because it could
receive surface water from both sources.
The state proposed to build basins used to recharge surface water during wet
periods from the Kern River and the California Aqueduct. The water then would
be extracted in dry years through a system of wells and canals connecting to the
California Aqueduct. In 1988, the state purchased the property and began
planning for the completion of the project. The state completed extraction wells
and canals, and constructed some test storage facilities, but never completed the
full project.
River during surplus periods and delivered it and native groundwater on the property to Southern California.
The project was criticized on the basis that the chances the Colorado River would have surplus supplies were
poor and the use of native groundwater could potentially harm the desert ecosystem.
145. For a detailed discussion of the status of the Kern Water Bank in 1988 and the legal underpinnings
for the construction of the bank, see generally Russell Kletzing, Imported Groundwater Banking: The Kern
Water Bank-A Case Study, 19 PAC. L.J. 1225 (1988). The term "water bank" comes from the view that
conjunctive use programs function like financial institutions. Water is "saved" during wet periods and
"withdrawn" during dry periods, much like financial institutions hold money for use at another time by their
depositors. The Kern Water Bank consisted of several large areas or "elements" under control of different
entities. The parcel under control of the DWR is known as the "Kern Fan Element." It is that parcel that is the
subject of this article, and not the other elements of the Kern Water Bank. Planning & Conservation League v.
Dept. of Water Res., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 173, 181 (Ct. App. 2000). The Kern Fan Element is commonly referred
to as simply the Kern Water Bank, and this usage is adopted in this article.
146. CAL. WATER CODE § 11258 (West 1992). The State Water Project is the largest state funded water
facility in the United States. It supplies water for over twenty million Californians. Its major features include
Oroville Dam, San Luis Dam, and the California Aqueduct.
147. See Cal. Assembly Con. Res. No. 80 (1987); Ronald B. Robie & Patricia R. Donovan, Water
Management of the Future: A Ground Water Storage Program for the California State Water Project, 11 PAC.
L.J. 41, 54 (1979). The Kern Water Bank is especially valuable because it provides storage to the southern
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. There are fewer storage sites south of the Delta than north and there are limited
pumping windows, fall and winter, to divert water south of the Delta due to pumping limitations imposed on the
State Water Project and Central Project. When these projects have these windows, they need to take advantage
of that opportunity to pump water and move it south of the Delta for storage, to later meet customer's demands,
which peak during the summer.
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Before the full project could be built, DWR was required by a statute adopted
in 1985 to enter into a contract with the local agency receiving State Water
Project supply whose boundaries included the groundwater project, manifesting
another example of the trend toward local control.148 DWR is not required to
enter into a contract with local agencies for its surface storage facilities.
Although the Legislature did not clearly specify what was needed to be included
in the contract, this requirement gave considerable control over the completion of
the full project to the Kern County Water Agency ("KCWA"), the agency whose
boundaries included the Bank, because its interests had to be satisfied in the
contract. After years of negotiation, DWR and KCWA ultimately were unable to
complete a contract.
The state elected in 1995 to transfer the Kern Water Bank to the Kern Water
Bank Authority, a local joint power agency created to own and operate the water
bank. This transfer was part of the Monterey Agreement, which significantly
changed the water supply agreements between the DWR and the twenty-nine water
agencies that receive water from the State Water Project.149 After the transfer, the
Kern Water Bank became operational and now provides conjunctive use benefits for
water users in Kern County and around the state. Since operations began,
groundwater levels in that area have improved significantly.
The transfer of the Kern Water Bank from the state to local agencies further
represents movement to local control over groundwater resources through
programmatic means and is consistent with the growing trend of local control
over groundwater. As a result of the transfer, the Kern Water Bank Authority has
been able to manage and deliver an average of fifty thousand acre-feet per year to
water users in the area. This has significantly improved Kern County control over
its local groundwater resources, while simultaneously diminishing state authority.
G. Groundwater Quality and Local Management
The Commission recognized groundwater quality as a problem in the Final
Report, finding that groundwater quality problems were complex and varied from
basin to basin. 50 Groundwater quality encompasses salinity, contamination from
natural sources, and pollution from human activities. 151 Often, many of these
groundwater quality problems are the result of activities occurring on the surface
that are unrelated to the exercise of groundwater rights. As a result, it is not
surprising that the Commission did not make any recommendations relating to
mitigating groundwater quality problems in a report devoted to reviewing
California's water rights.
148. CAL. WATER CODE § 11258 (West 1992).
149. Planning & Conservation League, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182.
150. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 141.
151. Id.
490
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Although groundwater quality problems may not be the result of groundwater
management, they can be significant and place an additional burden on groundwater
management. In the last twenty years, groundwater quality has become of equal
concern to water quantity in some groundwater basins. The causes for decline in
water quality vary from basin to basin, but it is more often than not still related to
surface activities. These activities include industrial waste disposal operations,
leaking underground storage tanks, and the agricultural application of fertilizers and
pesticides.
152
At the time of the Final Report, groundwater pollution was largely unregulated.
Since then, the Legislature has developed several regulatory approached based on the
source of the pollution to protect groundwater. Some of these approaches have required
local control, whereas others have favored state involvement. Underground storage
tanks are regulated through a "cradle to grave" permit system under local control.
153
The city or county where the tank is located manages this permit system.
154
Also consistent with the move to local control, the Legislature adopted the Local
Groundwater Management Assistance Act of 2000.155 Under this Act, DWR may
appropriate funds to local agencies to carry out groundwater monitoring and
management activities. 156 Priority for available funding is given to local agencies that
have completed a local groundwater management plan. 57 The DWR collects the data
obtained by this program. 58 AB 3030 plans also reflect an increased interest in
groundwater quality. Plans may expressly contain references to control saline
intrusion and mitigation of contaminated groundwater. 1
59
Agricultural pesticide application that is likely to affect groundwater quality
is regulated under a statewide approach through the California Pesticide
Contamination Prevention Act. 160 The Act's primary focus requires that potential
groundwater pollution be considered in registering for and renewal of the use of
agricultural pesticides.' 6t This Act also provides for the creation of a list of
pesticides that have the potential to cause groundwater pollution, known as the
152. 2 KENNETH A. MANASTER & DANIEL P. SELMI, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND LAND
USE PRACTICE § 33.02, at 33-16.1 to 33-17 (2004).
153. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25280-25299.7 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004). One of the
major groundwater quality problems over the last decade concerns the gasoline additive MTBE, methyl tertiary
butyl ether, used to improve octane rating. Unlike other gasoline products, MTBE does not biodegrade quickly
in soil. As a consequence, MTBE leaking from underground storage tanks pose a greater threat than similar
chemicals that biodegrade more quickly. The Legislature has taken several measures to address the MTBE
issue, including adding more stringent container requirements for tanks installed after July 31, 2003. Id.
§ 25290.1; MANASTER & SELMI, supra note 152, at § 33.0417], at 33-43 to 33-49.
154. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25283 (West 1999).
155. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10795-10795.20 (West Supp. 2004).
156. Id. § 10795.6.
157. Id. § 10795.6(a).
158. Id. § 10795.19.
159. Id. § 10753.8.
160. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 13141-13152 (West 2001).
161. Id. § 13141(f).
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"Groundwater Protection List."'' 62 If a chemical is used in accordance with law,
but its use still causes groundwater pollution, the registration of the pesticide for
legal use is subject to cancellation. 163
Certain groundwater quality problems are not related to surface pollution, but
instead arise from the exercise of groundwater rights. For instance, groundwater
overdraft in a basin may induce the movement of poor quality water into higher
quality water.164 The resulting water quality degradation could reduce usable
storage space within the basin. 165 In addition, groundwater pumping near the coast
can draw saline water into coastal aquifers, making them unusable for consumptive
purposes. As a result, groundwater supply and quality are increasingly viewed
interdependently and are being managed in an integrated manner.
166
In Jordan v. City of Santa Barbara,167 a significant case addressing
groundwater quality, the court considered whether municipalities pumping
groundwater as appropriators in a basin could be held liable to farmers and
overlying users for a deterioration in water quality. 68 The overlying users had
sued arguing that, due to excessive pumping, the municipalities had caused the
groundwater basin to become excessively saline and degraded in quality. 169 The
farmers postulated that groundwater pumping by the cities caused salts in the
lower aquifer to migrate into the aquifer used by the farmers. 170 Under a
correlative rights doctrine analysis, the overlying users have senior rights as
appropriators for groundwater quantity purposes. What is uncertain is whether
the correlative rights doctrine applies to groundwater quality as well, which
would have given the farmers senior priority and an advantage in the case.17'
The Jordan court, however, analyzed the dispute using a torts analysis,
considering whether the appropriators were a substantial factor or legal cause of
the injuries sustained by the farmers. 172 The court concluded that factually the
overdraft was not the cause of the salinity problem, but instead agricultural
162. Id. § 13145(d).
163. Id. § 13151. The registrant of the chemical has the opportunity for a hearing before any action
changing or canceling a chemical's registration is taken. Id. § 13149(c).
164. BULLETIN 160-93, supra note 143, at 89.
165. Id.
166. BULLETIN 118-2003, supra note 18, at 3.
167. 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 340 (Ct. App. 1996).
168. Id. at 343-44.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Courts have considered the applicability of surface water rights in the context of surface water
quality problems. The California Supreme Court has held that Delta senior appropriators have no right to force
junior appropriators upstream to cease diversion to hold back salt water incoming from the tides in the Delta.
Antioch v. Williams Irrigation. Dist, 205 P. 688, 694-95 (Cal. 1922). In addition, Delta riparian users have no
right to a certain salinity quality if to control salinity results in an unreasonable use of water. United States v.
State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 174 (Ct. App. 1986).
172. Jordan, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 343.
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irrigation was the cause. 173 Thus, the court concluded the municipalities were not
liable for the water quality degradation. 174 Because the court did not address the
application of the correlative rights doctrine to resolve this water quality dispute,
the argument remains open for use in the future.
V. CONCLUSION
Groundwater management programs have expanded significantly since the
Final Report was adopted. Consistent with the recommendation of the Final
Report, most of these innovations have occurred through authority or programs
under local agency control and now groundwater management responsibility has
been largely consolidated at the local level.
Despite these management tools, the fundamental problem discussed twenty-
five years ago in the Final Report-overdraft-has not gone away or even
diminished in certain regions. Overdraft remains the number one problem that
needs to be addressed, although problems associated with water quality have
grown over the last twenty-five years. No one would deny in many areas that
sustained overdraft is not good resource management, but a real solution to the
problem has not yet emerged. Perhaps what is lacking is a real commitment by
state and local policy makers to address the problem.
Evidence that commitment is lacking on the state level is apparent. Despite the
concerns expressed in the Final Report, the Legislature has not recently committed
funding to study and understand the scope of the overdraft problem. For instance, the
state has not fully re-examined critical groundwater basins in detail since 1980.
Recent data is lacking about the full scope of the program. The Legislature, although
it has had the opportunity, has never passed a statute eliminating overdraft in all
basins to ensure groundwater resources are readily available for all future
generations.1
75
If the movement in the state is towards local control, then the solution to
overdraft must also come primarily through local initiative. Several possibilities are
feasible based on the models discussed earlier. Using AB 3030 plans as a model,
176
local agencies responsible for managing overdrafted basins could develop a
scientifically supportable plan to eliminate overdraft within a reasonable time frame
and then implement it. These plans would be developed with public input and review
and in compliance with applicable environmental laws. Where possible, plans to
eliminate overdraft should be integrated with regional water management, which
includes surface water and land use management. Local agencies not in overdrafted
basins would not be required to complete these plans. If more than one agency
173. Id. at 356.
174. Id. at 357.
175. Other states have specifically adopted groundwater mining statutes that prohibit overdraft. See, e.g.,
Baker v. Ore-Ida, 513 P.2d 627 (Idaho 1973).
176. See supra Part IV.C.
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overlies a basin and those agencies are unable to develop a coordinated plan, another
option is to adopt special groundwater districts.
Some may argue that since the water users in a particular area caused the
overdraft, they should be primarily responsible for the cost associated with fixing
it. However, the state, through the fiscal assistance model discussed earlier, has
spent statewide funds to solve local problems. Consistent with this approach, the
state could issue bonds or secure funding specifically to correct the overdraft
problem. 77 As an alternative, the local agency could use a cost sharing approach,
as is done in other parts of state water management encouraging local action.
178
These approaches are consistent with the Final Report's recommendation to
move towards local control. If certain local agencies with overdrafted basins do
not act, the Legislature could intervene and force local action by requiring the
implementation of measures to reduce overdraft through the AB 3030 process. If
the political consensus does not exist to take this action, at a minimum, the state
should fund another special study to describe and better quantify the extent of the
groundwater overdraft problem and to give an estimation of how much time is
available before permanent harm is done to each basin. Action to remedy
overdraft now may be costly and painful, but it would be better then letting the
situation continue to decline to the point where a remedy is impossible. With
these steps, California could finally solve the groundwater problems so plainly
identified by the Commission twenty-five years ago.
177. Determining the role of state funding for projects primarily benefiting a local area is one of the
major challenges facing state water officials today. The usual approach is to charge the water users directly
within the area receiving the water supply benefits. However, state funding may be appropriate in some
circumstances, because the benefits of groundwater management programs extend beyond the local area and
help the entire groundwater basin. Furthermore, there are general benefits to other groundwater basins within
the state when groundwater overdraft is reduced in a particular area. This puts less pressure on other basins to
supply water to the previously overdrafted area.
178. For instance, flood control projects are cost shared by the federal government, state government,
and the local government benefited from the project. CAL. WATER CODE § 12585.7 (West Supp. 2004). For
flood control projects authorized after January 1, 2002, the local government pays between thirty to fifty percent
of the non-federal costs of the project. Id.
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